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Abstract: In The Vision Machine (1994) Paul Virilio uses powerful imagery to
warn us about the consequences of our increasing dependence on “vision
machines.” With little use, he claims that our sense organs will atrophy and we
will degenerate into neurologically simple organisms. This article examines his
use of imagery, arguing (after Nicholsen, 1997; Saussy, 2006; and Taussig,
1993) that he mimetically replicates cultural anxieties as well as the destructive
drives he critiques. Arguing that he mourns the loss of an ideal human animal of
knowledge constituted through the Greek practice of techne¯ (Heidegger,1977),
the article further questions whether his writing is symptomatic of “left melan-
cholia” (Brown, 2003).
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Résumé : Dans La machine de vision (1994), Paul Virilio emploie des images
puissantes pour nous avertir des conséquences de notre dépendance croissante
par rapport aux « machines de vision ». Il croit que nos sens, en étant sous-
utilisés, s’atrophient et que nous allons nous dégrader, devenant des organismes
neurologiquement simples. Cet article examine les images que Virilio utilise; il
soutient (à l’exemple de Nicholsen, 1997; Saussy, 2006; et Taussig, 1993) que
cet auteur reproduit mimétiquement des anxiétés culturelles ainsi que les
pulsions destructrices mêmes qu’il critique. L’article, affirmant qu’il fait le deuil
d’un animal humain idéal possédant un savoir formé au moyen de la pratique
grecque du techne¯ (Heidegger, 1977), soulève en outre la question de l’écriture
de Virilio en tant que symptôme de « mélancolie de gauche » (Brown, 2003).
Mots clés : Théorie des médias; Théories sur la technologie; Le corps
A warning to humankind
In Paul Virilio’s provocative volumes on technology and contemporary life1 the
modernist dream of a “harmonious machine civilization” envisioned by Le
Corbusier is nowhere in sight. Virilio (1994, 1995) vividly paints the devastating
consequences of the obsessive cult of technology for both terrestrial and human
forms of life. In The Art of the Motor (1995) he announces that the very nature of
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our bodies is in the process of being radically transformed. He warns us that nei-
ther “ethics [n]or biopolitical morality” are able to protect the body from being
transformed into “primary material” (1995, p. 113) with the emergence of what
he calls “technoscientific fundamentalism” (p. 120).
The will to power of a science without a conscience will pave the way
for a kind of intolerance yet unimaginable today precisely because it will
not simply attack peculiarities of the species like sex, race or religion. It
will attack what is alive, “natural” vitality finally being eliminated by the
quasi-messianic coming of the wholly hyper-activated man. (1995,
p. 120, emphasis in original)
For Virilio, science in the late twentieth century inherently has no value—not just
for human life, but for life itself. He argues that the principles of the new “per-
verted science” (p. 120) are, in fact, the antithesis of life.
Alarmed by the way critics, artists, and scientists have embraced “technocul-
ture,” Virilio aims to provoke us, to wake us from our “sleep” (Armitage, 2001a,
pp. 3, 6). As he races with breathtaking speed across history, linking war and the
logistics of perception with innovations in the acceleration of communication,
transportation, and visual technologies (Kellner, 1999), he warns us about the
dangerous impulses of modernity’s dream of ever increasing acceleration. In an
attempt to burst any illusions of equating speed with (democratic forms of) free-
dom, he reminds us that Marinetti’s futurist movement, which supported the rise
of Italian fascism during the 1920s and 1930s, was also characterized by the cel-
ebration of speed and the desire to escape the material confines of the human
body (Armitage, 2001a; Virilio, 1994, 1995; Zurbrugg, 2001). For Virilio, “those
who are optimistic about [modern and hypermodern] technology are very closely
allied to Fascism” (quoted in Zurbrugg, 2001, p. 158).
Although scholars are critical of Virilio’s “demonization” of technology and
his lack of faith in democratic alternatives (Armitage, 2001a; Kellner, 1999;
Redhead, 2004), as Kellner states, “Paul Virilio is one of the most prolific and
penetrating critics of the drama of technology in the contemporary era” (1999, p.
103). Over the past decade as an increasing number of his texts have been trans-
lated into English, scholars have sought to definitively pin down his political and
theoretical position (see Armitage, 2000; Armitage, 2001a; James, 2007; Kellner,
1999; Redhead, 2004). Yet scholars who focus on Virilio’s ideas tend to overlook
one of the most powerful dimensions of his work: his form of writing, what he
refers to as his painterly approach to theory. Virilio reflects:
At this point one enters into the realm of emotional responses. I’m so
involved in the world of painting and the world of art that I don’t speak
about it much in my books because I live it! I am a painter who
writes. . . . Surely you feel that my books are very visual. . . . They’re not
words, they’re visions! (quoted in Zurbrugg, 2001, p. 160)
Taking Virilio’s lead, this article examines his powerful “visions” of modern
technology. In particular it focuses on the imagery he creates to capture the
destructive forces of “vision machines” and the consequences for humans as ani-
mals of knowledge. The article concentrates on his imagery in The Vision
Machine (1994) with some reference to The Art of the Motor (1995). In both
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books, the influence of phenomenology on his conception of humans as embod-
ied and sensual beings is evident. Though, unlike other philosophers of technol-
ogy influenced by phenomenology (Hayles, 1999, 2005; Idhe, 1990, 2002;
Sobchack, 2004), who recognize the active forces of the body, in the face of the
violent forces of modernity, Virilio views the human body as passive. He claims
that our increasing dependence on vision machines has meant that we use our
sense organs less and less. With lack of use, he warns us that our bodies are
regressing into disorganized, “dyslexic” pulsating flesh, unable to apprehend the
worlds in which we live.
As I will argue, Virilio uses mimetic techniques to create graphic imagery to
warn us about the destructive forces of modern technologies like vision
machines.2 Through mimetic replication he captures the way these technologies
“attack what is alive,” invoking feelings of horror, fear, and disgust. To examine
Virilio’s imagery in detail, I draw on discussions on mimesis from the fields of
anthropology (Taussig, 1993) and aesthetic theory (Jay, 1997; Nicholsen, 1997;
Saussy, 2006). On the one hand, I ask whether Virilio’s mimetic techniques have
a critical potential, shattering the thrall that vision machines and other modern
technologies have over us. On the other hand, I question whether Virilio’s
mimetic techniques place him in danger of replicating the forces he aims to cri-
tique, of becoming possessed by their destructive drives. To conclude, the article
then takes a closer look at Virilio’s disturbing dystopic vision of humankind and
questions whether his views are symptomatic of a deep melancholy,3 which
Wendy Brown (2003) has argued afflicts left intellectuals trapped in mourning the
lost promises of modernity.
Vision machines
Before discussing Virilio’s use of mimetic techniques, I will outline his thesis on
vision machines and the degeneration of the human body, revealing the influence
of phenomenology on his conception of humans. For Virilio, the body is the basis
for two essential attributes of humankind: knowledge and imagination. His essay
“Topographical Amnesia” (1994) argues that our increasing dependence on
vision machines that selectively record and interpret the world, whether tele-
scopes, cameras, or digital recorders, has led to the degeneration of our ability to
know the world as well as a decrease in our capacity for imagination. Like
Merleau-Ponty (1962), for Virilio, sight with all its neurological and cognitive
processes is the sense that forms the foundation of our capacity to perceive and
thus know or, in more phenomenological terms, apprehend the world.
According to Merleau-Ponty, whom Armitage claims has had a great influ-
ence on Virilio (Armitage 2001a; see also Virilio, 1994, 1995), our ability to
apprehend the world relies on a synthesis of perceptions from multiple senses,
whether sound, touch, or smell. At one level, according to Merleau-Ponty (1962),
the synthesis of our perceptions makes it possible for our bodies to orient them-
selves and move as well as engage in a range of activities in specific environ-
ments with various people. Through the synthesis of perceptions we generate
kinesthetic images that Merleau-Ponty refers to as “body images.” Over time,
these images become the basis of the non-conscious embodied assumptions about
the nature of our worlds and underlie a range of potential responses to any num-
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ber of situations. For example, after repeatedly walking down a narrow flimsy
staircase with a rickety handrail, one’s body image would form in relation to the
staircase and shape how one might cautiously walk down the stairs, attuned to the
danger of falling without having to consciously check every step and constantly
remind oneself to avoid using the handrail. Thus the body image is not static. It
is generated through an accumulation of experiences. Ideally it changes over
time, incorporating new interactions with various environments and people.
Virilio argues that relying on vision machines means that we will decreas-
ingly use our visual organs and the physiological and cognitive mechanisms asso-
ciated with their operation. This has severe consequences. For example, he notes
that studies
record a weakening of the central (foveal) vision, the site of the most
acute sensation, along with subsequent enhancing of a more or less fran-
tic peripheral vision—a dissociation of sight in which the heterogeneous
swamps the homogenous. This means that, as in narcotic states, the
series of visual impressions become meaningless. They no longer seem
to belong to us, they just exist. (Virilio, 1994, pp. 8-9)
To understand the link between our sense organs—specifically, our eyes—and
our ability to make sense of the world, I turn to Virilio’s discussion of “visual
dyslexia.” He cites teachers who have observed the damaging effects of vision
machines on “the last few generations” who “have great difficulty understanding
what they read because they are incapable of re-presenting it to themselves”
(1994, p. 8, emphasis in original). According to Virilio, the ability to read depends
on our visual abilities. Reading refers to interpretation: interpreting sensory
impressions and synthesizing them into the meaningful units of comprehension
within a specific system of signification or language. As we use our eyes less and
less, we find it increasingly difficult to interpret visual sense data and synthesize
them into meaningful units of comprehension. As we lose the ability to use our
eyes, we lose the ability to know the world.
To use our sense organs to read, Virilio (1994) says we need to learn bodily
techniques of perception. Merleau-Ponty’s influence on Virilio is evident here.
Merleau-Ponty (1962) explains that as we learn techniques to see and hear, for
example, what is in our environments, over time we incorporate these techniques
into our taken-for-granted movements, dispositions, and responses. These tech-
niques integrate us with our surroundings and become the foundations of under-
standing the worlds in which we live (Merleau-Ponty 1962). But while
Merleau-Ponty does not hesitate to explore the use of prosthetics (canes, eye
glasses) as extensions of our sensory organs, in contrast, Virilio posits that pros-
thetic devices, especially modern optical devices (for example, see the discus-
sion of military sighting technology below), replace versus extend our capacity
to see. He argues that as we increasingly rely on vision machines, we no longer
regularly practise bodily techniques (phenomenological means of apprehension)
(Virilio, 1994).
To illustrate the consequences, Virilio presents historical cases. He points out
that since “lamps came into fashion” in France, it “is the young who are wearing
glasses; good eyes are now only to be found among the old who have kept up the
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habit of reading and writing” (Virilio, 1994, p. 10, emphasis added). The “habit
of reading and writing,” in other words, is a bodily technique that trains sense
organs to apprehend visual data. Those who decreasingly practise the bodily tech-
niques of perception end up with atrophied sense organs—in this case our eyes.
In Virilio’s view, the bodies of those who rely on vision machines to interpret and
synthesize sense data are increasingly reduced to passive (or weakened) amor-
phous flesh and steadily lose the capacity to apprehend the world.
According to Virilio we are not only losing the ability to perceive the world
but also the ability to recollect our experiences. This has dire consequences for
the second essential human attribute: the imagination. The techniques of
mnemonics are especially important for the imagination, which in turn involves
anticipation. Anticipation, the ability to conceive what may happen next, relies on
the ability to remember. Virilio explains that we
do not manufacture mental images on the basis of what [we] are imme-
diately given to see, but on the basis of . . . memories, from which, by
[ourselves we can fill] in the blanks and [our] minds with images cre-
ated retrospectively, as in childhood. (p. 3, emphasis in original) 
Thus our memories of previous events provide the basis for anticipating what
might happen next. It is important to emphasize that for Virilio, like vision, mem-
ory does not consist of just virtual images. Memory entails bodily techniques:
mnemonics. Virilio cites Cicero’s ancient “Method of Loci” as his ideal
mnemonic model, which he refers to as a “topographical system” (1994, p. 3).
This “imagery-mnemonics” consists of selecting a sequence of places and items
that can be ordered in time and space, such as the rooms and furniture in a house.
The material to be remembered, for example, points in a speech, are associated
with individual rooms and pieces of furniture. To recall your speech, you imag-
ine yourself walking in sequence through the rooms past the furniture, which trig-
ger your memory of the sequence of points. But with our increasing reliance on
technological devices to store data, we have stopped practicing mnemonic tech-
niques. As a result we find it difficult to recall both information and our own
experiences of the world.
Vision machines also threaten memory also because they reduce our ability
to retain mental images. 
With the industrial proliferation of visual and audio-visual prostheses
and unrestrained use of instantaneous transmission equipment from ear-
liest childhood onwards, we now routinely see the encoding of increas-
ingly elaborate mental images together with a steady decline in retention
rates and recall. In other words we are looking at the rapid decline in
mnemonic consolidation (Virilio, 1994, pp. 6-7).
To describe in more detail how the act of imagining necessarily involves per-
ception and especially recollection, Virilio turns to Western art. Virilio argues that
the veracity of a work of art depends on the ability to produce an illusion that
engages our visual organs. He explains that artists “solicit” the
eye (and possibly the body) movement in the witness who, in order to
sense an object with maximum clarity must accomplish an enormous
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number of tiny, rapid movements from one part of the object to another.
Conversely, if the eye’s motility is transformed into fixity ‘by artificial
lenses or bad habits, the sensory apparatus undergoes distortion and
vision degenerates.’ (Virilio, 1994, p. 2, emphasis in original)
Virilio discusses the work of the sculptor Rodin to describe the way artists solicit
eye movements of “witnesses” to invoke their imagination. Rodin insists that the
veracity of his sculptures is accomplished by fashioning his work with imprecise
details—in contrast to mechanical reproductions, such as photography. For exam-
ple, one foot of the sculpture of a woman might be disproportionately larger than
the other, or facial features might sag and drip in ways that suggest a body col-
lapsing with exhaustion. Insofar as the imprecise details make the sculpture either
“fall short of” or go “beyond immediate vision” (p. 2)—they are suggestive. The
missing but suggested physiological details engage the imagination of the viewer.
They compel the viewer to “fill in the blanks” either retrospectively or by antic-
ipating the next movement of the body.
The capability to “sense” what might have come before or anticipate what
might come next is essential in the realm of art. Unlike photographs or other
images produced by vision machines, the artist works with the viewer’s percep-
tion and experiential memory. Rodin captures the body in a state that anticipates
something beyond itself—beyond what is depicted—whether another movement,
person, or event. In contrast, images produced by vision machines do not involve
bodily techniques of perception and memory. Vision machines precisely record
all details of a body or event in a given moment, whereas artistic techniques work
purposely with imprecision and incompleteness to suggest possibilities beyond
what is seen. Thus, vision machines, according to Virilio, fail to engage the
body’s capacity to imagine.
Over time, with the reliance on vision machines, the human body decreas-
ingly perceives and recollects. Instead it simply receives whatever images flash
before it. Virilio concludes that the body is reduced to a simple organism drawn
to phatic images and other stimuli. The phatic image is
a targeted image that forces you to look and holds your attention—[it] is
not only a pure product of photographic and cinematic focusing. . . . [It]
is the result of an ever-brighter illumination, of the intensity of its defi-
nition, singling out only specific areas, the context mostly disappearing
into a blur. (1994, p. 14)
Here Virilio suggests that, like infants, we are drawn to intense images, rather
than exploring the underlying forces of what is at play. This is another example
of how Virilio’s work diverges from other phenomenological studies, especially
those that explore the embodied cultural processes of reading images produced
by modern technologies. Most significantly, Virilio’s analysis stands in stark con-
trast to Roland Barthes’ 1972 Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography.
While Virilio assumes that humans are powerless in the face of modern technolo-
gies like photography, Barthes explores the complex experiential and mnemonic
dynamics of reading photographs as temporal imprints of events and people as
they become engulfed into what has passed. But it could be argued that while
Barthes is concerned with the possibilities of “reading,” Virilio is more concerned
572 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 33 (4)
with the consequences of a visual regime that destroys our capacity for phenom-
enological readings.
As Virilio explains, phatic images and vision machines are situated in a
broader industrial-military context. In the first half of the twentieth century,
phatic images, he writes, “spread like wildfire in the service of political or finan-
cial totalitarian powers in . . . North America as well as in destructed countries
like the Soviet Union and Germany, which were carved up after revolution and
military defeat” (1994, p. 14). Virilio argues that vision machines (and the phatic
images they produce) are one element in the increasing domination of what he
calls the “logistics of perception” (1994, pp. 4, 12; see also Virilio, 1989). The
logistics of perception entail the reconfiguration of sight around a military logic
that organizes everything in terms of securing control and annihilation. Whether
the telegraph or satellite, it involves a logistics that abstracts and “delocalizes,”
accelerating the speed of calculation and transmission of information.
Alerting readers to the spread of the logistics of perception, Virilio traces its
movement from its military roots to broader society. He describes how “optical
arsenal” designed in accordance with the logistics of perception shifted the “line
of sight” of the firearm—“cannons, rifles, machine guns used on an unprecedented
scale [in the First and Second World Wars]—to cameras, the high-speed equip-
ment of aerial intelligence, projecting an image of the de-materialized world”
(1994, p. 13). Millions of men in battlefields became dependent on “lines of sight,”
whether looking across the barrels of their rifles or at intelligence photographs
mapping the terrain of carnage. This inaugurated a “revolutionary change in the
regime of vision” (p. 13). Americans and Europeans stopped believing their eyes
and started investing their faith in “the technical sightline” of battlefield devices.
Virilio claims that this led to a fusion-confusion of eye and camera lens. As eyes
became rigid and immobile, “losing their natural speed and sensitivity, photo-
graphic shots . . . became faster” (p. 13). He suggests here not only that humans
are losing the ability to apprehend the world, but also that destructive industrial-
military technologies are rapidly assimilating these capabilities.
Imagery of the body and cultural anxieties
As short provocative treatises, it could be argued that Virilio’s texts belong to a
tradition of critical intervention (see Ellul, 1964; Klein, 2007; Lifton & Falk,
1982; Mumford, 1970; Plumwood, 1993; Shiva, 1999) that warns us about our
material and emotional investments in increasing levels of destructive techno-
logical control and exploitation of global environments and populations. It is my
contention that the power of his texts does not rely simply on convincing argu-
mentation and evidence. There is more going on. He creates imagery, for exam-
ple, of humans reduced to “pitiful caricatures of semi-immobility” (Virilio,
1994, p.8) that confronts us with the terrifying, annihilating technological forces
that we now rely on. In this section, I examine his use of mimetic techniques to
create graphic imagery of degenerated human bodies. I examine whether his
techniques end up replicating the destructive forces of technology he critiques,4
placing him in danger of becoming possessed by their power, or alternatively,
whether he successfully generates imagery that shatters the thrall these technolo-
gies have over us.
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In many ways, Virilio’s imagery recalls iconic science fiction novels and
films, whether William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984) and The Matrix (1999) or
more recent texts, like Code 46 (2004) (Stacey, in press). These texts give us
glimpses into a future where humans have been reduced to compliant bodies
plugged into insidious networks of technology. They introduce us to dystopias
where there is little possibility for existence outside the eugenic and/or digital
order of things. Those who slip outside the grasp of the totalitarian techno-megac-
ities become outcasts, valueless “human waste” (Bauman, 2004, p. 80) in toxic
borderlands. The imagery of passive bodies and “human waste” in these texts
draws its power from imagery that evokes feelings of horror, disgust, and fear.
To illustrate the way this imagery works, it is useful to examine a scene from
the iconic film The Matrix. I have selected the frequently cited scene where
Morpheus introduces Neo to reality outside the illusions of the computer-gener-
ated matrix. The audience is presented with a terrifying Art Nouveau cum Gothic
nightmare. Chords of choral-like music drive toward a dissonant climax as cam-
eras pan to show huge black towers that soar into the dark sky and disappear into
unseen depths. Almost the entire human population—millions of unconscious
“sleeping” bodies—is arranged in tiers of glowing red pods encircling the black
towers. The audience experiences the horror of this organic-machine in a close-
up that replays the moment when Neo “wakes up.” The camera frame is filled
with his pale body immersed in thick mucus, recalling a fetus in a mother’s
womb. But rather than safely nestled in amniotic fluid, Neo has black leechlike
tubes plugged into his body’s central nervous system, feeding his electrical power
into the world of machines.
This scene draws on images filled with modern Man’s contradictory fear of
and fascination with technology and the power to create life (Hayles, 1999;
Porter, 2003; Ullman, 2002). In The Matrix the massive black towers laden with
seedlike pods invoke an image of Nature gone mad, calling up misogynist images
of a monstrous mother that breeds ceaselessly (Constable, 1999, 2006; Springer,
1999). The horror of machines plays regressively with the horror of the Mother
who refuses to release her children from her womb, infantilizing her grown off-
spring so they remain dependent extensions of her life. As if plucked from
Freud’s worst nightmare, the Mother is parasitic, her power expanding as she
feeds off their unfulfilled potential.
Humans who regain consciousness, like offspring who threaten the Mother
with too much autonomy, are unplugged from the life support system and flushed
out of their pods in a sequence recalling birth. They are then liquefied and fed
intravenously to the living in a closed system that resembles the livestock facto-
ries producing fresh meat infected with bovine spongiform encephalomyelitis for
the globe’s carnivorous human populations.
The imagery, like the imagery in other iconic science fiction texts like
Neuromancer, consists of a constellation of references, many of which gather their
emotional force from regressive impulses and anxieties. As the description above
suggests, the constellation reaches its own visual-aural-emotional climax with the
misogynist imagery of the Mother gone mad. In Virilio’s work, one experiences
similar feelings of climax as he graphically captures the destructive drive of tech-
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nology and its horrific end: the regression of human life to primordial, pulsating
matter. Virilio most vividly captures this climactic end in his description of the
human body as it is stripped of embodied perceptual techniques in his essay “A
Topographical Amnesia” (1994). In the following quote he describes what hap-
pens when “vision machines” replace the movements of the eye.
The age-old act of seeing was to be replaced by a regressive perceptual
state, a kind of syncretism, resembling a pitiful caricature of the semi-
immobility of early infancy, the sensitive substratum now existing only
as a fuzzy morass from which a few shapes, smells, sounds accidentally
leap out . . . more sharply perceived.” (p. 8)
In Virilio’s apocalyptic world, when techniques of perception, and specifically
ocular movements involved in the act of seeing, are replaced by vision machines,
the body degenerates, becoming semi-immobile, capable of only passively receiv-
ing sensory data. Virilio here uses evocative language filled with revulsion and
fear to describe the degraded state of the human: “pitiful caricature,” “early
infancy,” “fuzzy morass from which a few shapes, smells, sounds accidentally leap
out.” There is zeal in capturing the amoebic state of humans and also a hint of
scorn for those who constantly seek out the latest technological innovations drawn
to the ever brighter, sensually stimulating phatic image. Their desire for the tech-
nological innovation suggests a childlike obsession for the latest gadgets with no
consideration of the consequences. The description of our regression to a “pitiful
caricature” of “early infancy” links this obsession with infantile fascination.
The imagery of pulsating primordial flesh is disturbing. Virilio ’s description
mimetically replicates the imagery of amorphous flesh, like the scene from The
Matrix, with all the references to the infant human as an uncontained bundle of
bodily impulses, responding to simple stimuli and sensations. Virilio’s imagery
suggests that the ungoverned, undisciplined body of the modern human, like the
infant, has not been inculcated into socially meaningful coordinates of movement
and gesture. This imagery of the infant as a difficult to decipher bundle of drools,
cries, and coos oblivious to social boundaries is replete with cultural anxieties,
including the fear of being completely dependent on the M/other. Dependence
and lack of control over bodily functions threatens the fiction of the autonomous,
self-controlled subject. Drawing on regressive fears and pathological repressions,
as a body outside of the Symbolic, the Law of the Father, it is flesh outside mean-
ing, driven by primordial impulses (Silverman, 1983). In the most reactionary
terms, this imagery stands in for “the Other” incarnate: whether the female body
or uncontrollable floods of human waste.
While Virilio mimetically replicates imagery of amorphous infantile flesh in
his imagery of modern humans, in contrast to the Matrix films, he does not cou-
ple this horror with a fascination with the powers of the human mind. For exam-
ple, in the Matrix trilogy one can escape the confines of the human body through
the virtual world, with its promise of delivering a head rush of unimaginable con-
trol. The audience follows Morpheus and his crew as they jack off into the matrix:
instantly becoming superhero fantasy-selves with hard six-pack torsos, death-
defying speed, and kung fu expertise uploaded in a flash. The crew takes us on
an entertaining romp as they navigate portals and glitches with equipment that
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looks like it was soldered together from a trawl through pawn shops and garage
sales, a gesture to the creative bricolage of the humans eking out a life in the ruins
of William Gibson’s post-apocalyptic cities.
Rather than celebrating the exhilarating experiences of new technologies,
Virilio warns us about the destructive cult of speed and power. “With accelera-
tion, there is no more here and there, only the mental confusion of near and far,
present and future, real and unreal—a mix of history, stories and the hallucina-
tory utopia of communication technologies” (Virilio, 1995, p. 35). For Virilio, the
appeal of the exhilarating experience of technology is nothing new. For instance
he draws on literary figures such as Flaubert, who describes the craving for
increasingly intense and accelerated experiences in the 1870s. Virilio describes
Flaubert as a “habitué of train travel” (p. 80) with cravings for travelling to far-
flung places across the globe and overcoming the material limitations of his body.
Railway travel introduced inconceivable speeds to journeys that previously took
days and months by foot and horse. Virilio suggests that the train as a new trans-
portation technology had the effect of liberating travellers from their bodies.
Flaubert’s musings from over 130 years ago seem eerily similar to the writings of
high-tech cyberfanatics. “Aren’t you tired of this body that weighs on your soul
and cramps it like a narrow [prison] cell would? Demolish the flesh, then . . . we
shun the flesh, we execrate it” (quoted in Virilio, 1995, p. 80).
This quote shows how the fascination with speed is coupled with a disgust of
the body. Yet while critical of this fascination, Virilio uses language that mimics
the impulses of Flaubert. For example, he writes, “[t]o expand, to dissolve,
become weightless, burst, leave one’s heavy body behind: our whole destiny
could now be read in terms of escape, of evasion” (p. 80). In this quote he appears
to “try on” the language, moving into its logic, its drives, as with his descriptions
of the “semi-mobile” human impulsively drawn to phatic images. The quote is
but one example of how his language replicates the same fatalistic, self-combust-
ing drives that he critiques. Thus like his replication of the reactionary cultural
anxieties about the body (even if these anxieties are mobilized to warn us about
destructive technological forces) circulating in iconic science fiction texts, he
also mimetically replicates the imagery of writers like Flaubert who celebrate
body-combusting technologies.
Like the futurists he criticizes, Virilio, too, seems fascinated with speed and
technologies that exceed the limits of the human body. In his interview with
Zurbrugg his fascination with the power of technology is demonstrated in the
analogy he uses to describe the relation between humans and technology: the bib-
lical image of Jacob (humankind) wrestling with the angel (or God, representing
the powerful forces of technology). Rather than “sleeping before technology,” he
is determined like Jacob to fight against it, “not to destroy it, but in order to trans-
figure it” (quoted in Zurbrugg, 2001, p. 157). Given this analogy, it is no surprise
to find a degree of relish as well as fascination in his mimetic replication of tech-
nology’s destructive force. The following example, where Virilio distinguishes
the logistics of perception from pre-modern embodied forms of vision, further
illustrates this point: “The advent of the logistics of perception . . . ushered in a
eugenics of sight, a pre-emptive abortion of the diversity of mental images, of the
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swarm of image-beings doomed to remain unborn” (1994, p. 12). Here Virilio’s
references to eugenics and abortion again rely on graphic images of the body, but
in this case explicitly appeal to moral and religious sensibilities. He refers to the
violent extermination of the innocent: targeted segments of the population reviled
as mutant, abnormal, and threatening as well as vulnerable unborn image-beings,
both have manifold Catholic references.
Mimesis: Seduction or illumination?
Virilio’s mimesis suggests a compulsiveness as well as a “seduction.”5 The
anthropologist and cultural theorist Michael Taussig describes mimesis as the
compulsion “to copy, to imitate, to explore difference, yield into and become
Other” (Taussig, 1993, p. xiii). In the urge to copy resides the magical power of
replication: “the image affecting what it is an image of, wherein the representa-
tion shares in or takes power from the represented” (p. 2). It involves “a palpa-
ble, sensuous, connection between the very body of the perceiver and the
perceived” (p. 21). There is a pleasure in mimesis. It entails taking possession
and, specifically, taking “power from the represented.”
Ethological studies claim that mimesis has roots in the deception strategies
of both predator and prey. Drawing on Merlin Donald’s studies, Yann-Pierre
Montelle writes:
Mimesis is often defined as a behavioural process whereby what is
achieved is a close external resemblance [to another animal] . . . that is
distasteful or harmful to potential predators [to evade becoming their
prey]. Mimesis therefore is imitation. . . . It is by imitating that most of
our learning (conscious or not) is done. (Montelle, 2006, p. 24)
Montelle suggests that mimesis is deeply rooted in instinctual drives. If Virilio’s
work expresses a pleasure in imitation, what type of pleasure is it? Montelle states
that “exercising imitative behaviour . . . [reduces] the alterity of ‘otherness’ and
by performing deceiving hermeneutic tactics, the destabilising unknown [can be]
framed” (p. 24). Yet Virilio is not imitating to make threatening forces familiar:
to understand and gain control over the destructive drives so they can be inte-
grated into the familiar terrain of our lives. He is trying to make the enormity of
their violence evident. But as Taussig argues, mimesis does not just simply
deliver control over what is copied. Mimesis requires the perceiver also to yield
to the other, with the danger of losing oneself. In other words, mimesis can result
in being possessed by the other: assimilated, ingested, or obliterated.
Before concluding that Virilio is possessed by the destructive forces of mod-
ern technology, it is useful to consider aesthetic theories of mimesis elaborated by
Haun Saussy (2006) and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (1997). Their work is influ-
enced by Aristotle (1982), Walter Benjamin (1978), and Theodore Adorno
(1997), and more recently by Buck-Morss (1977, 1989).
Given Virilio’s phenomenological approach, I first turn to Saussy (2006),
whose discussion of mimetic literary techniques makes analogies to mimetic
physiological processes such as perception and digestion. Saussy writes that “per-
ception in its way digests the object—assimilates it by breaking it down and tak-
ing it in, though only formally, not materially like digestion” (p. 116), where
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“mixed substances of food are ground up, separated into various kinds and then
selectively assimilated by the blood, which takes into itself that which, in the
food, resembles it and can be used to maintain bodily heat; the leftover is elimi-
nated” (p. 116). Saussy elaborates on the principle of formal similarity. A sensory
organ is “in some way of the same nature as the things it is to perceive” (p. 116).
For example, the eye is able to receive impressions of shape and colour. It then
“reproduces within itself, the corresponding forms that outer objects possess”
(p. 116), just as the ear can receive impressions of volume and pitch and repro-
duce a corresponding sound the perceiver can hear.
According to Saussy, this formal principle of mimesis applies not only to per-
ception but also to linguistic mimesis. Both perception and language rely on iden-
tifying formal similarities. Saussy explains that metaphors, which are a form of
linguistic mimesis, rely on what Aristotle considers “a gift for ‘seeing the same-
ness’ in two unrelated things” (p. 116). When the mind recognizes different things
as similar, as in metaphor, there is a recognition of something that makes them
the same (p. 117): a common form. Moreover, as Saussy argues, form is not trans-
portable intact from one context to another without transformation.6 Thus in rela-
tion to Virilio’s imagery, it is necessary to ask, how is the form of the futurists’
celebration of the destructive technological drives transposed into his texts? To
what extent is the form transformed when Virilio mimetically replicates it?
Saussy describes how form is transformed through mimesis in his analysis of
Xu Zhimo’s 1924 Chinese translation of Baudelaire’s 1857 poem “Une
Charogne” (“A Carcass”), which gives a visceral account of a carcass rotting in
the hot sun being devoured by maggots. As Saussy explains, Xu is concerned
with translating the form of Baudelaire’s poem, not the linguistic content: what
Xu identifies as its “music”—which he describes in the words of fourth-century
BCE philosopher Zhuang Zhou as “the piping of heaven . . . earth and . . . man”
(Saussy, 2006, p. 122). In this creative use of mimetic techniques, matter is selec-
tively appropriated and then assimilated according to “his need.”
In terms of power, Saussy claims that that Xu does not fall into the trap of
Aristotle’s model of mimesis where the “non-self” is assimilated or digested into
and made consistent with self (2006, p. 126). While the “I” remains intact in Xu’s
mimetic imitation of the “Corpse,” “the decay provides matter for the formal cre-
ation of a new artwork” (Kahn, 2006, p. 4). In mirroring the decay of the poem’s
rotting corpse and combining it with the fourth-century Daoist philosophy of
Zhuangzi (where “there is no self to defend”), Xu makes “translation, compara-
tive literature . . . appear as a process of dissolution, of decay, of selective uptake”
(Saussy, 2006, p. 26). Ingested, both Baudelaire and Zhuangzi become difficult
to recognize. The mimetic imitation thus results not as much in a new self as in
what Saussy calls a new “crowd of selves” that feed off the corpse and the cor-
pus of modern literature.
In a similar manner, Virilio applauds the work of artists insofar as “every
time a new technology appears, art diverges from it” (quoted in Zurbrugg, 2001,
p. 158). But Virilio does not use Xu’s creative mimetic techniques. His imagery
does not diverge from the reactionary imagery of the degenerated body or the
futurist fascination with speed. Both remain identifiable in his imagery. But again
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concluding that Virilio is digested by the destructive forces of modern technol-
ogy, it is important to consider the challenge he faces in mimetically copying
these forces. Saussy is more concerned with mimetic techniques to ensure the
author does not assimilate a less powerful Other into his or her self, rather than
being assimilated by the Other.
Walter Benjamin’s work on mimesis pays particular attention to the power
relations. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (1997) states that for Benjamin, like Taussig,
mimesis is rooted in ancient forms of magical imitation and functions as “a
means to connect with and control or be transformed by the power and order
inherent in the other” (Nicholsen, 1997, p. 57). In other words, for Benjamin,
mimesis entails relations of power where the author is in danger of being
engulfed by the other.
With the disappearance of magic, Benjamin argues that the mimetic faculty
has migrated to language: “It is now language which represents the medium in
which objects meet and enter into relationship with each other, no longer directly,
as once in the mind of the augur or priest, but in their essences, in their most
volatile and delicate substance” (quoted in Nicholsen, 1997, p. 58). Language has
become an “archive of nonsensuous similarity” (p. 58). For artists and writers
exploring ways to break out of the reified forms of modern consciousness or post-
fordist rhizomic forms of capital, there are rich possibilities in Benjamin’s “non-
sensuous similarity.” Bringing together non-sensuous words “arrayed around the
thing they all mean” can ignite a revelatory shock of understanding (Nicholsen,
1997, p. 58). Here it is important to note that mimetic work sharply differs from
conceptual work. Insofar as mimesis enacts an imitation, it is non-conceptual: it
relies on experience. As Martin Jay argues with respect to Adorno’s formulation
of mimesis, which has been influenced by Benjamin:
Conceptual thought can be thought of as an act of aggression perpetrated
by a dominant subject on a world assumed to be external to it; it sub-
sumes particulars under universals, violently reducing their uniqueness
to typifications . . . of a general . . . principle. Mimesis, in contrast,
involves a more sympathetic, compassionate, and noncoercive relation-
ship of affinity between nonidentitical particulars. (Jay, 1997, p. 32)
Thus while the conceptual aggressively strips the particularity of the world,
Benjamin’s mimesis seeks affinities between that which is characterized by dif-
ference.7 So rather than seeking to gain control over an Other (whether weak or
powerful), Benjamin’s and Adorno’s mimesis aims to generate non-coercive rela-
tions of affinity.
Nicholsen claims that the critical potential of Benjamin’s form of mimesis
lies in the possibility of drawing together word-images that are linked in their
non-sensuous similarities to an enigmatic “ ‘thing’ at the center, which is not lan-
guage. . . . [The enigmatic thing] binds the dissimilar, in fact alien words
together” (Nicholsen, 1997, p. 78). It is only in the constellation of word-images
that the similarities become evident and their sudden coherence incites a shock of
realization (p. 78).
It could be argued that Virilio succeeds in creating a constellation of word-
images of the body and technology that shocks us, illuminating the violent nature
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of both our fascination with modern technologies and their destructive force. He
works with the dynamics of the technological forces themselves, creating a con-
stellation that shatters fantasies of technology’s power to project us into the
Transcendental realm where we can escape the reduction of our increasingly
powerless, devalued bodies amidst techno-proliferating levels of risk and the loss
of living environments. Virilio exposes the way images that offer fantasies of
freedom are violently rooted technological drives of obliteration. Yet while
Virilio’s texts expose the roots of these fantasies, at another level, there remains
something disturbingly seductive about his imagery. As suggested above, there is
a relish and pleasure in creating powerful constellations that have the capacity to
shock me as a reader with apocalyptic visions.
As a reader, I experience Virilio’s powerful ability to capture the exhilarat-
ing, horrifying imagery of technological destruction. As he adroitly leaps between
historical periods, he catapults his readers into the future, a future that has already
arrived, confronting us with an apocalypse that it is too late to stop, that “neither
ethics nor biopolitical morality” can protect us from (Virilio, 1995, p. 113). His
texts overwhelm the reader with images of the drive of obliteration. He states,
“Since the standard acceleration magnitude has reached the absolute limit of
180,000 miles per second . . . elimination will now be pursued right inside living
matter” (p. 105, emphasis in original). The Art of the Motor and The Vision
Machine offer no room to even imagine anything that escapes annihilating forces
of exponentially increasing forms of control: for uncertainty and the unknowable.
Thus, unlike Xu, the form he copies retains its character; in this case its destruc-
tive power.
The future he paints is dystopic without the Christian allusions to the coming
of the messiah or the falling of man (Idhe, 1990): it simply is a drive toward the
elimination of “living matter.” Without hope, there is no space to continue to go
on living (Said, 2003). It is no surprise that Virilio’s texts do not open themselves
to the possible, the “yet to come.” Virilio has already concluded that the
Metaphysical disappeared with mechanical reproduction. The capacity to realize
a realm beyond what is present, what remains unknowable, for Virilio instantiates
the sacred. This is evident in his statement: “In the West, the death of God and the
death of art are indissociable” (1994, p. 17). The bodily practices of perception
necessary for engaging with art are also necessary for realizing the presence of
the sacred. Here, recall that Virilio defines art as a practice that engages our per-
ception. Art necessarily relies on embodied techniques of perception. It is our
bodies that make it possible to anticipate, to imagine both retrospectively and
beyond what is given, in other words, to realize the sacred. With our dependence
on vision machines, our bodily techniques of perception have atrophied, destroy-
ing the capacity to imagine, and with it, the ability to realize the sacred.
Trapped in mourning: The animal of knowledge
Kellner describes Virilio as “[mourning] the loss of the phenomenological dimen-
sion that privileges experience” (1999, p. 117).
[He is committed] to philosophical perspectives committed to the pri-
macy of the body, subjective experience and concrete relations to the
earth that he sees as being undermined in both technological experience
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and contemporary theories which deconstruct experiences of the body
and subject. (p. 117)
This section outlines the dangers of mourning, which can result in an inability to
engage with the world in which the mourning subject lives. First, however, I want
to examine what Virilio appears to mourn. The claim that Virilio mourns “the
phenomenological dimension that privileges experience” simplifies both Virilio’s
position as well as phenomenology. More accurately, Virilio mourns a particular
conception of human experience. It has similarities to the conception found in
Heidegger’s description of humans as animals of knowledge, which is based on
ancient Greek notions of techne¯. As I will argue below, it is humans as animals
of knowledge that Virilio mourns.
To make this argument, I begin by drawing a parallel between Heidegger’s
conception of Greek techne¯ and Virilio’s conception of “bodily techniques” of
perception. Both techne¯ and Virilio’s bodily techniques of perception are based
on phenomenological conceptions of the human subject and human knowledge.
Heidegger (1977) writes: “Techne¯ is the name not only for the activities and skills
of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. [Moreover,
techne¯] belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis” (p. 13). He further explains that
“[techne¯] is linked to the word episteme . . . knowing in the widest sense . . .
[which entails being] entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert
in it” (p. 13).
Like Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of perception, Heideggerian techne¯ is an
activity that transforms what it works on—substances, body movements, living
matter—enculturating it with meaning and value, incorporating it into fields of
human activity. As an “art,” techne¯ always operates in relation to the terms of a
specific episteme. The fact that as an “art” it is “entirely at home” in whatever it
transforms suggests that it becomes familiar with the substance it transforms. It
suggests that as techne¯ is crafted over time, it takes into account the characteris-
tics of whatever it works upon. There is a mutual relation between the formation
of techne¯ and the substance it transforms. Rather than imposing abstract order,
techne¯ in its “highest sense . . . lets things emerge as they are” (Heidegger, 1977,
p. 11). The things “call forth . . . thought” within the terms set by their mode of
being (Lovitt, 1977, p. xxviii). As such, insofar as techne¯ “belongs to bringing-
forth” in the “highest sense,” it entails bringing forth the presence of the nature
of a thing it works upon.8
Heidegger claims that in relation to human crafts, techne¯ also brings forth
that which is in the “craftsman or artist” (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 11-12). Here
Heidegger conceives the “craftsman or artist” also in phenomenological terms,
being enculturated within the terms of an episteme specific to a place and time.
While Heidegger claims the Greek craftsmen let things “presence as they are in
themselves,” in the modern period he claims scientists increasingly have sought
“not a reality beyond [and other than] himself [in the thing] but precisely that
which was present as and within his own consciousness” (Lovitt, 1977, p. xxvi).
The modern episteme entails control over “reality.” The substance worked upon
is reified and fashioned within terms set by modern Man. The mutual relation of
constitution is lost. The scientist reduces the substance to the terms of the epis-
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teme. Yet, as Heidegger argues, modern forms of techne¯ still bring forth the
nature of a thing: the instrumental formation of modern “man himself”
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 28).
Virilio’s vision machines driven by war and the logistics of perception can be
seen in terms of “modern” techne¯,9 which instrumentally reduce the significance
of things to the dominant terms of existence, making the material and the social
and affective qualities of things (what characterizes their being) insignificant.
This, in turn, strips the inherent power of things in themselves. Within this logic,
vision machines render the matter of living impotent, turning it into malleable
primary material. As Virilio suggests, stripping away techne¯ and replacing bodily
practices with vision machines amounts to dispensing with the body: “Devices
for seeing [vision machines] dispense with the artist’s body in so far as it is light
that actually makes the image” (Virilio, 1994, p. 160).
The conclusions Virilio reaches are alarming. Like Heidegger’s modern epis-
teme, the logistics of perception is driven by a reductive law, but unlike the mod-
ern episteme, it specifically targets life forms, stripping them of complexity. The
reduction to passive flesh suggests a regression in evolution back to simpler
forms of life lacking in neurological complexity and moral-political develop-
ment. I do not dispute the fact that biological and human life forms as well as
planetary existence are under threat (Gilroy, 2004). But I question embracing the
conclusion that the inherent power of things (humans, bodies of water, micro-
processors, plants, turbine engines, microbes, buildings, photocopies) has been
completely denuded and all things have been reduced to “primary material.” This
grants far too much effective power to the reductive drives characterizing what
Virilio calls the “antithesis to life.”
Consider Virilio’s argument that increasing the speed of the body’s rhythms
to the speed of “instant teletechnology” destroys the distinction between “inter-
nal and external and promotes hypercentrality—that time, of some ‘present’ if not
‘real’ time” (1995, p. 106, emphasis in original). Virilio writes, “Being present
[previously] meant . . . being physically close to the other in face-to-face, vis-à-
vis proximity [which made] dialogue possible through voice and eye contact”
(p. 106). But “media proximity,” which is based on the properties of electromag-
netic waves, has diminished the value of physically coming together. We can now
“teleact at a distance—see, hear, speak, touch and even smell at a distance”
(p. 106). According to Virilio,
the ‘body image’—the individual’s SELF PERCEPTION—[will not be
left] intact for long. . . .  Sooner or later, intimate perception of one’s
gravimetric mass will lose all concrete evidence. (p. 106, emphasis in
original)
Here Virilio suggests our bodies are literally disappearing and our minds degener-
ating. Soon whatever remains will witness the disappearance of the human
species.
Virilio (1995) further warns us about the micro-scale “endocolonization” of
our bodies.
The recent progress in science and technology today resulted in the grad-
ual colonization of the organs and entrails of man’s animal body, the
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invasion of the microphysical finishing off the job that the geophysical
invasion began. (pp. 99-100)
Now the nervous system will be stimulated, the vitality of memory or the
imagination, new mnemonic practices producing a structuring sensa-
tion. . . . Neuroscience’s METADESIGN . . . now wants to regenerate the
impulses of the neurotransmitters of the living “subject,” thereby achiev-
ing a sort of cognitive ergonomics. (p. 105, emphasis in original)
Here Virilio describes the invasive reach of technology into the microprocesses
of the body, fuelled by the drive to expand and colonize. In Virilio’s visions there
appears to be no escape, or what Raymond Williams described in his foreboding
book Towards 2000 (1983) no “resources of hope,” in Virilio’s visions. Does
Virilio grant too much effective power to the processes of reduction in a future
that has already arrived? I would argue he does not take into account the massive
resources needed to orchestrate control over vast heterogeneous networks and
populations.
It would be easy to argue that Virilio mourns the loss of Greek techne¯, a.k.a.
Tradition. This would overlook the way his thinking lays out a conception of
human life that integrates the living, perceiving body and the capacity to appre-
hend, recall, and imagine beyond what we (believe we) know about the worlds in
which we live. One could argue that in some ways, Virilio’s work is akin to that
of feminists like Vivian Sobchack (2004) and Katherine Hayles (1999, 2005).
Both portray the living body as essential in the process of knowing and imagin-
ing the world. Virilio regrettably, however, does not consider feminist scholars,
and instead misreads and dismisses them (Armitage, 2001b). For instance,
Armitage asks Virilio to respond to the developments of cyberfeminism, “a
movement that some see as one of the most important theoretical and political
developments in the past decade with respect to our understanding of the human
body, technology and subjectivity” (2001b, p. 44). Virilio replies:
Even if it is still at the gimmick stage, it is a well-known fact that
research is very advanced in the field of ‘tele,’ ‘remote,’ or cybersexual-
ity, especially in Japan. And thus I am baffled to see feminists—far from
opposing, like I do, the conditioning of the female body, or the male body
for that matter—projecting themselves as followers of cybersexual-
ity. . . . Do [they] really believe that cybersexuality is going to liberate
them? . . . [It entails the] replacement of emotional involvement by elec-
trical impulses . . . they will be servants of a new type of sexual con-
trol . . . machine controlled sexuality. (quoted in Armitage, 2001b, p. 44)
Virilio’s dismissal of feminists’ “theoretical and political developments” with
regard to the body, technology, and subjectivity in terms of a “gimmick stage” not
only suggests his scorn, but his equation of cyberfeminists with followers of
cybersexuality also indicates that he has not systematically read their work.
But I am less concerned with what is obviously Virilio’s ideal human sub-
ject than with the way his work appears to be trapped in mourning, in melan-
choly. He seems unable to let go of something he assumes has been lost.
Grieving this loss, he refuses to reach beyond the terms of the model for the
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world. The inability to engage with the contemporary changing world is evident
in his inability to contemplate anything other than the degeneration of human
life. Even if his aim is to blow apart the fantasies of academics who blindly
embrace technoscience, his focus on the techniques to effectively blow apart
their fantasies point to the way he is enthralled by the destructive forces of
modernity.10 And while Virilio asserts “Resistance is always possible!” (quoted
in Armitage, 2000, p. 194, emphasis in original), resistance seems impossible in
the worlds he paints in his texts.
Wendy Brown writes about the melancholy of left intellectuals, what Walter
Benjamin referred to as “left melancholia,” pointing out that “we come to love
our Left passions and reasons, our Left analyses and convictions, more than we
love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms”
(Brown, 2003, pp. 460). Benjamin defines left melancholia as “a mournful, con-
servative, backward-looking attachment to a feeling, analysis, or relationship that
has been rendered thing-like and frozen in the heart of the putative Leftist”
(quoted in Brown, 2003, p. 460). It issues from an “unaccountable loss, some
unadvowedly crushed ideal” (p. 460). Brown identifies many losses for the Left
over the last century, including labour and class, socialist regimes, the legitimacy
of Marxism, a unified movement, and alternatives to capitalism (p. 460).
Although many on the Left can acknowledge these losses, Brown contends there
is an unavowed loss, the loss of the promise that “Left analysis and . . . commit-
ment would supply its adherents with a clear and certain path towards the good
the right and the true” (p. 460). She claims that this was the basis for the pleas-
ure of being on the Left and the basis of our “self-love as Leftists.” To give up
this love up would require a radical transformation of the self. Brown turns to
Freud to explain
that if the love for the dead object or destroyed ideal cannot be given up,
it takes its refuge in narcissistic identification, and hate comes into oper-
ation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer
and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering. (quoted in Brown,
2003, p. 460)
Brown claims that identity movements as well as post-structuralism and
post-modernism have become the substitutive objects blamed for the Left’s
weakness and its inability to generate coherent authoritative accounts of the
world. This scorn safeguards the critics from recognizing the inadequacy of their
own analyses. With regard to Virilio, as mentioned above, his energies are
focused on mimetically capturing the destructive drive of modern technology
rather than considering what is necessary for a new basis for life, for example,
non-humanist modes of eco-centred living (for example, see Heyd, 2005; Katz,
Light, & Rothenberg, 2000; Plumwood, 1993; Shiva, 1999; Wong, 2008).
Caught in mourning for the loss of pre-modern techne¯, which, for Virilio, is
tied to the sacred, he seems to refuse to let go of that to which he is profoundly
attached, to accept its death. As a result, he views the world around him in terms
of painful absence and is unable to realize that life continues to undergo trans-
formation rather than just destruction (Freud, 1984).11 His zeal in describing the
collapse of the human world, atrophied human bodies, the mad worship of
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speed, and the penetrating reach of the antithesis of life at its most infinitesimal
level suggests that humans have become his substitute object. His imagery
debases the human body as he sadistically describes our reduction to neurologi-
cally simple organisms capable only of a few feeble winks and squirms. The
danger of melancholy is that it makes it impossible to accept the loss. The sub-
ject thus becomes locked in stasis, unable to realize the adaptive and transforma-
tive potential of life forms and cultural practices: what might be the basis for
new forms of techne¯ that instantiate sustainable relations between life forms and
socio-political technologies. For example, as I have suggested, he refuses to
engage with the work by feminist scholars and artists who have critically theo-
rized techno-body interfaces. What is “other” and “not yet” is all of what escapes
and transmutes the relentless colonization of life that he so vividly paints.
Yet to dismiss Virilio because of his melancholy and how it plays out in the
regressive disgust and fear of the body overlooks what else drives his work. He
is alarmed by terrifying technological and political reconfigurations where
transnationals, neo-imperial centres, and military forces have lost control over
what happens next as the Earth teeters toward its environmental limits and
human populations toward self-destruction whether through war, overconsump-
tion, or the deep malaise of depression. In this context, in contrast to
Traditionalists and Modernists, he does not call for a return to order, asserting
the Law to bring unruly bodies and masses into the semblance of coherent
organization. Yet nor does he offer resources for hope, unlike Edward Said
(1995), who has attempted to learn about the possibilities and dangers of the
global from those who are viewed as the most hopeless, dispossessed popula-
tions. Instead, Virilio seems to embrace the melancholia of loss. He does not
consider what might be entailed in generating new adaptive tactics for living and
transforming this world. This makes sense, since as he argues, little remains of
the subject and nothing of the Metaphysical. Characteristic of melancholia, he is
unable to fully accept the loss (or failure) of his ideal; as such, he is in danger of
following his lost world into death.
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Notes
1. For example, see his books War and Cinema (1989), The Vision Machine (1994), The Art of the
Motor (1995), Politics of the Very Worst (1999), Information Bomb (2000), and Ground Zero
(2002).
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2. Similar dystopic imagery circulates in the work of contemporary theorists like Giorgio Agamben
(1998), especially his work on “naked life.” Agamben is someone for whom Virilio “has a bound-
less admiration” (Armitage, 2001a, p. 45). Zygmunt Bauman in Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its
Outcasts (2004) and Globalization: The Human Consequences (1998) uses similar imagery in his
descriptions of displaced populations as “the waste of globalization” and “human waste” (see
Armitage, 2001b, p. 3). 
3. Significantly, Virilio is recognized as a modernist or “hypermodernist” rather than a postmod-
ernist like Baudrillard insofar as he takes a strong moral stand on the evils of technology and iden-
tifies logic and knowledge as central human characteristics (see Armitage, 2001a, and Kellner,
1999).
4. For example, it could be argued that the rapid translations of his short provocative texts hit the
English-speaking market with critical and explosive ideas, much like rapid-fire artillery or phatic
images that bombard populations in advertising.
5. The term “seduction” was a term used by Michael Dillon at Lancaster University to describe the
operation of digital code.
6. Saussy discusses this point in relation to digital technology.
7. Jay points out that Horkheimer and Adorno are aware of “the sinister potential of mimetic behav-
iour when combined with instrumental rationality that it has typically been used to counter,” for
example, in the case of the Nazis’ mimicry of Jewish people (Jay, 1997, p. 30).
8. Nature is not equated with a static essence but rather something in the process of becoming. See
Heidegger’s essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” (1971).
9. It is not a matter of simply stripping away techne¯ and leaving bodies as passive flesh, but rather
the imposition of a new type of post-disciplinary techne¯.
10. Virilio does not deterministically view all science and technology as agents of destruction. See
his discussion of the ship as “the great technical and scientific carrier of the West,” where he
describes how it entailed an interplay between “poiein” and “tekhne” (Virilio, 1994, pp. 28-30).
Every failure of technical knowledge (the shipwreck) opened up a “poetics of wandering, of the
unexpected” (p. 28). With respect to modern technologies, Nick Prior from the University of
Edinburgh makes the point (June 18, 2008, personal correspondence) that Virilio does not seem
to take into account his own preoccupation with “the accident,” which suggests that the very tech-
nologies he warns us about will fail anyway.
11. There is a growing body of scholarship on melancholy that argues that it is not necessarily patho-
logical to refuse to let go of the loved object. It can be a refusal to forget, a refusal to enact clo-
sure and “lay the past to rest.” It can be a commitment to continuing an engagement with “loss
and its remains” that makes sites for memories, cultures, and histories denied by the dominant
order (Eng & Kazanjian, 2003; Forter, 2007). Greg Forter makes reference to Philip Novak and
Michael Moon, who argue that “for blacks and queers . . . melancholia [is] not a pathology . . .
but . . . a mechanism that helps (re)construct identity and take our dead to the various battles we
must wage in their names” (Forter, 2007, p. 241). Forter points out that in particular, for gay men
and women to relinquish their loved ones, as Freud’s model for mourning would require, would
be to undergo normalization insofar as it would require them to give up their same-sex lover (p.
241). Though as Forter notes, Freud’s mourning does not require us to “relinquish” nor forget the
loved one, only to accept that she or he is dead (p. 241). The melancholic, according to Freud, as
Forter argues, in fact can’t remember the lost object because it has been withdrawn from con-
sciousness and been incorporated into the unconscious. The withdrawal of the lost object from
consciousness results in aggressive behaviour toward the displaced object (p. 241).
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